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ECONOMIC DISORGANIZATION FOLLOWING
LIBERATION
The Japanese occupation of Korea ended on August 15, 1945 and was sup-
planted in part by a U.S. military government. The immediate postwar period
was characterized by extreme economic disorganization and stagnation caused
by the sudden separation of the Korean economy from the Japanese economic
bloc, and by the partition of the country along the 38th parallel. —
Under colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, the Korean economy became Me
highly dependent upon Japan for capital, technology, and management. Of the Ma
total authorized capital of business establishments in Korea, the Japanese Ch
owned approximately 94 percent, as of 1940.1 Japanese engineers and tech-
nicians employed in manufacturing, construction, and public utilities in 1944
constituted about 80 percent of the total technical manpower in Korea. The Pri
proportion of Korean engineers and technicians was particularly small in the Ha
metal and chemical industries (11 to 12 percent).2 The relative number of
Korean business establishments was very small in high-technology industries—
about 10 percent in the metal and chemical industries and 25 percent in the Ce4'
machinery industry. Most Korean establishments were small and used simpler Log!.
technology than the Japanese. Furthermore, establishments in Korea were
mainly subsidiaries of Japanese companies. Therefore, the sudden retreat of
the Japanese and the separation of the economy from the Japanese economic —
bloc brought about a suspension of many production activities in Korea.
Partition also had deleterious effects on the South Korean economy. In
• 1940, Korea's total population was 23.5 million people, 15.6 million in the put
South and 7.9 million in the North. Approximately 92 percent of average an-
nual power generation, however, had come from plants in the North and most Au
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of the country's mineral resources were located there too. In 1940, the North
produced about 90 percent of Korea's output of metal products and 83 percent
of its chemical products (Table 2—1). By contrast, the South accounted for
72 percent of machinery production, 85 percent of textile production, 64 per-
cent of processed food output, and 89 percent of printing and publishing out-
put in the same year. Thus, metals, electric power, and chemical industries
were located mainly in North Korea at the time of liberation, while light in-
dustries and machinery production tended to be located in the South.
The number of industrial establishments and employment in South Korea
declined sharply after 1945 when the Japanese left and when firms closed for
lack of electricity. The industrial survey of November 1946 showed that the
number of manufacturing establishments had dropped by 43.7 percent since
TABLE 2-1
Manufacturing Output and Employment, 1940 and 1948
(output in millions of 1948 constant won)
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Korea s turing
Share Output, 1948
turing
Workers,
1948
(000)All Korea South Korea
Metal 49.2(9.3) 4.9(2.0) (10.0) 2.2(4.2) 4.9(3.7)
Machinery 19.3(3.6) 13.9(5.6) (72.0) 3.4(6.4) 14.4(11.0)
Chemicals 181.5(34.2) 30.7(12.4) (16.9) 15.2(28.8) 32.6(24.9).
Textiles 72.8(13.7) 61.5(24.8) (84.5) 21.6(41.0) 60.4(46.1)
Foods 118.8(22.4) 76.0(30.6) (64.0) 6.6(12.5) 9.0(6.9)
Ceramics 15.7(3.0) 4.3(1.7) (27.4) 1.4(2.7) 5.6(4.3)
Printing 7.0(1.3) 6.2(2.5) (88.6) 1.6(3.1) 2.4(1.8)
Handicrafts 7.6(1.4) 4.9(2.0) (64.5) 0.7(1.3) 1.8(1.4)
Other 59.0(11.1) 45.7(18.4) (77.5) 0.0 0.0
Total 530.9(100.0) 248.1(100.0) (46.8) 52.6(100.0) 131.1(100.0)
Central government operated 1l.6(22.1)b 37.g(28.8)b
Local government operated 6.8(12.9)b
Private 34.2(65.0) 67.8(51.7)
Total 52.6(100.0) 131.1(100.0)
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NOTE: Figures in parentheses are percentages.
SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1949, pp. 1—47—1—48.
a. Data for 1940 were recompiled by Bank of Korea to obtain manufacturing out-
put for South Korea.
b. These shares were large because the government took over Japanese firms after
August 1945. Most of those firms were later sold to private interests.
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1944. Manufacturing employment was 59.4 percent lower. In 1948 total man-
ufacturing output in South Korea was only about one-fifth of the 1940 level
(Table 2—1) and had declined sharply in every major sector. (Manufacturing
output is likely to have been much lower in 1946, but data are not available.)
In addition to the drastic decline in domestic manufacturing, severe food
shortages developed after the war. Population increased rapidly because of Rice
the immigration of refugees from the North and the repatriation of Koreans Wheat
from Japan and other countries. Since domestic grain output was not enough Anthr
to feed the increased population, the U.S. military government imported Tungs
about 670 thousand metric tons of food (including wheat, barley, rice, and Salt
powdered milk) from May 1946 to January 1948.
roce
Uncontrolled expansion of the money supply before and after liberation Raws
set off a hyper-inflation. Currency in circulation expanded by about 6.7 times Cotto
between the end of 1941 and August 15, After the liberation, it ex- Cotto
panded 77 percent between August 15 and November 1, 1945 and by about Paper
15 times in the four years and four months from August 15, 1945 to the end Laun
of 1949. Prices rose very rapidly. The Seoul retail price index increased about Ceme
123 times from June 1945 to June 1949. China
The U.S. military government attempted to control inflation by announc- Nails
ing maximum prices on essential goods and by rationing. These measures Trans
were not successful and were accompanied by increased black market activ- Light
ities. When this became apparent, the government relaxed the controls. Av
Aver
ex
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TRADE,
1946 TO 1953 annu
Neither national income data nor an overall industrial production index is
available for the period 1946 to 1953. Production indexes are available, how- Of a
ever, for major commodities as shown in Table 2—2. the
Although the average production index for the major commodities is an
unweighted, simple average, it gives a rough indication of the growth rate of time
production. Starting from a very low base in 1946, the postwar recovery of indu11
production was fairly rapid. The average production index shown in Table 2—2 achiej
increased about two and a half times from 1946 to 1949. Electric power gen- tota!41
eration and tungsten production for export increased sharply. Heavy industry,
however, recovered much more slowly, especially iron and steel and chemicals.
The Korean War again brought a sharp drop in industrial production in port
1950 and 1951. By 1952 industrial production began to pick up again as the were
fighting gradually stalemated along the present demilitarized zone. Although only
hostilities did not cease until 1953, by that time the average production index Pu
(excluding tungsten) had slightly surpassed the 1949 level. The recovery, how-
ever, was uneven. Tungsten production increased spectacularly, but production cou
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TRADE, 1946 TO 1953 9
TABLE 2-2
Production Indexes of Major Commodities, 1946 to 1953
(1946 100)
Commodity 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Rice 115 123 122 121 94 77 117
Wheat and barley 90 95 123 127 74 106 125
Anthracite coal 169 281 347 222 44 175 269
Tungstenore 353 394 413 112 327 1,106 2,347
Salt 87 113 225 208 99 241 238
Processed marine products 72 61 118 52 61 61 78
Cigarettes and tobacco 237 296 367 280 316 480 433
Raw silk 100 91 92 46 66 70 112
Cotton yarn 109 115 247 191 111 188 257
Cottoricloth 119 79 230 198 116 154 216
Paper and paper products 83 84 213 150 62 266 261
Laundry soap 7 141 197 164 268 316 310
Cement 172 212 225 108 68 339 390
Chinaware 107 150 419 303 274 356 330
Nails 598 595 865 716 225 569 1,114
Transformers 93 74 41 14 53 51 57
Light bulbs 163 162 127 49 35 30 68
Electric power 109 217 291 182 140 282 327
Average index (unweighted) 155 184 259 180 135 270 392
Average index (unweighted)
excluding tungsten 143 171 250 184 124 221 277
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Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1955; variousSOURCE: Various indexes,
annual output figures, ibid.
of a number of commodities, such as coal and cotton cloth, did not reattain
the 1949 level.
From 1946 to 1953, the average production index increased about 3.9
times (2.8 times if tungsten is excluded). Despite its rapid growth, however,
industrial production in South Korea by 1953 was still far below the level
achieved in 1940. We can infer from the data presented above that by 1953
total industrial production was probably not much more than one-third of the
1940 level.
Table 2—3 gives merchandise exports and imports (excluding aid im-
ports) from 1946 to 1953. Since all export and import data for that period
were tabulated in won, we can show the trend in Korea's trade in real terms
only by deflating the export and import current price figures, using for this
purpose the Seoul wholesale price index.
South Korea's exports and imports in 1946 were negligible since the
country was only beginning to recover from World War II. By 1949 exports
1•
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TABLE 2-3
Merchandise Exports and Imports, 1945 to 1953
(millions of won)
.Current Pricesa Seoul Wholesale.Price Index
(1947 = 100)
1947
Constant .Prices
Exports ImportsExports Imports
1946 0.05 0.16 55.0 0.09 0.29
1947 1.11 2.09 [00.0 ' 1.11 2.09
1948 7.20 8.86 162.9 4.42 5.44
1949 11.27 14.74 222.8 5.06 6.62
1950b 32.57 5.21 348.0e 9.36 1.50
1951 45.91 121.83 2,l94.ld 2.09 5.55
1952 194.96 704.42 4,570.8 4.27 15.41
1953 398.72 2,237.01 5,951.0 6.70 37.59
NOTE: Table includes recorded private and government trade only. Aid-financed
imports, transactions with North Korea, and smuggling are excluded.
Souxce: Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review, 1955.
a. Exports and imports were valued in won according to fob. export or c.i.f.
port prices until March 1951; thereafter, according to domestic market prices (tariffs,
domestic taxes, and trade margins were subtracted from domestic prices to estimate the
price of imports).
b. Imports and exports through Inchon and Seoul customs offices were not included
because records were lost during the war.
c. Average index for June 1950.
d. Average index for April—December in Pusan.
and imports were still quite small, about $17 million and $22 million, respec-
tively.4 Although the Korean War severely disrupted trade patterns, exports
by 1953 exceeded the 1949 level by more than 32 percent and imports were
almost six times greater than in
Nearly all of South Korea's exports during this period were primary
products. Agricultural and fishery products generally declined from about 80
percent of total annual exports in 1946 to only some 10 to 15 percent during
1951—1953 because fishing was limited during the Korean War. On the other
hand, exports of mineral products, mainly tungsten but also graphite, copper,
kaolin, and talc, expanded sharply from about 10 percent of the total in 1946
to about 80 percent from 1951 to 1953.
Major imports in this period were food grains and manufactured goods.
In 1946, 1952, and 1953, food grain imports accounted for 34 to 44 percent
of total nonaid imports. In other years, when grain imports were not as high,
manufactured goods imports accounted for 39 to 59 percent of total imports.
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POST—KOREAN WAR RECONSTRUCTION 11
POST-KOREAN WAR RECONSTRUCTION
The Korean Armistice took effect on July 27, 1953. According to government
estimates, war damages to industrial offices, plant and equipment, public fa-
cilities, private dwellings, and transport equipment (exclusive of military in-
stallations) in South Korea were approximately $3.0 billion. This amount was
almost equal to estimated GNP for 1952 and 1953 combined.6 In addition,
about one million civilians were killed during the war.
After the Korean War, real GNP grew rapidly from 1953 to 1957, aver-
aging about 5 percent per annum. The only relatively bad year was 1956
when agricultural production declined almost 6 percent (Table 2—4). Mining
TABLE 2-4
Annual Percentage Growth of GNP and Major Sectors,
1954 to 1972
(1970 constant prices)
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Year GNP & Fishery & Mfg. Services
1954 5.5 7.6 11.2 2.5
1955 5.4 2.6 21.6 5.7
1956 0.4 —5.9 16.2 4.0
1957 7.7 9.1 9.7 5.8
1958 5.2 6.2 8.2 3.5
1959 3.9 —1.2 9.7 7.5
1960 1.9 —1.3 10.4 2.8
1961 4.8 11.9 3.6 —1.1
1962 3.1 —5.8 14.1 8.9
1963 8.8 8.1 15.7 7.4
1964 8.6 15.5 6.9 3.0
1965 6.1 —1.9 18.7 9.9
1966 12.4 10.8 15.6 12.6
1967 7.8 —5.0 21.6 13.8
1968 12.6 2.4 24.8 15.4
1969 15.0 12.5 19.9 14.6
1970 7.9 —0.9 18.2 8.9
1971
1972
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SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973, pp. 298—
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and manufacturing output grew by about 15 percent per annum. By contrast,
the period 1958 to 1960 was one of declining GNP growth, averaging less
than 4 percent. Since population increased about 2.9 percent per annum, per
capita income barely changed. The growth of mining and manufacturing aver-
aged only about 9 percent per annum from 1958 to 1960, less than two-thirds
of the rate in the preceding four-year period. One of the causes of the slow-
down from 1958 to 1960 was a financial stabilization program that had been
forcefully applied in 1957 and 1958.
Most of South Korea's imports from 1953 to 1960 were financed by 195
foreign aid grants from two sources: the United Nations Korea Reconstruction 195
Agency (UNKRA), which had been providing relief through the United Na- 195
tions Civil Assistance Command in Korea (UNCACK) during the war, and 195
the United States bilateral assistance program. UNKRA assistance from 1953 195
to 1960 totaled approximately $120 million, and official U.S. aid during the
same period amounted to $1,745 million, including $158 million of PL 480
196
goods. Foreign aid from both UNKRA and the United States was used for 196
importing food and essential industrial raw materials as well as capital goons. 196
Between 1954 and 1960, foreign assistance, excluding donations by foreign 196
voluntary organizations, financed more than 70 percent of total imports. 196
From 1956 to 1958 imports financed by U.S. aid exceeded 80 percent of total 196
imports. About 74 percent of South Korean investment was financed by for-
eign aid from 1953 to 1960. 19i
Rapid economic growth from 1953 to 1957, largely induced by substan-
tial injections of foreign assistance, was accompanied by rapid inflation (Table
19
2—5). The wholesale price index increased more than three and one-half times
19
between 1953 and 1957, an average annual rate of inflation of almost 40 per- 19
cent. Concern with inflation led to an agreement between the South Korean —
government and the Office of the Economic Coordinator (the U.S. ICA Mis-
sion to Korea) on a financial stabilization program which was implemented
from 1957. The annual rate of domestic inflation started to decline from that
th
year. Price stability was achieved in 1958—1959 (wholesale prices even de-
e
dined slightly in 1958). After the student revolution in April 1960, the new
government abandoned the stabilization program in its first months in office. cc
Wholesale prices rose by about 11 percent in 1960. grf
Commodity exports declined substantially during the period of rapid eco-
nomic growth in the 1950s. By 1957 they were less than one-half the 1953
level in dollar terms (Table 2—6). During the stabilization period, exports M
began a recovery, but did not reach the 1953 level until 1961. In any case,
during the whole period 1953 to 1960, exports of goods and services were neg- A
ligible, ranging from 1.1 to 2.4 percent of GNP (Table 2—7 and Figure 2—1). ha
Exports continued to be primarily mining, agricultural, and fishing products. ta
Imports of goods and services were substantial, ranging from 8.8 to 14.3 per- St
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TABLE 2-5
Major Price Indexes at MIdyear, 1953 to 1972
(1970= 100)
Wholesale Seoul
Wholesale Wholesale Price Index Consumer
GNP Price Price of Excluding Price
Year Deflator Index Foods Foods Index
1953 5.7 8.2 8.1 8.3 7.5
1954 7.5 10.5 6.5 13.9 10.2
1955 12.4 19.1 15.4 21.5 17.3
1956 16.2 25.1 24.7 26.2 21.2
1957 19.5 29.2 28.4 30.6 26.1
1958 19.4 27.3 23.3 30.3 25.3
1959 19.9 28.0 . 20.4 32.5 26.4
1960 21.8 31.0 24.4 35.2 28.6
1961 25.1 35.1 28.9 39.0 30.9
1962 28.6 38.4 32.6 41.9 32.9
1963 36.8 46.3 44.8 46.3 39.7
1964 48.6 62.3 61.4 61.5 51.4
1965 52.6 68.5 60.4 73.0 58.4
1966 60.1 74.6 65.3 79.8 65.4
1967 68.5 79.4 70.9 84.1 72.5
1968 76.6 85.8 79.7 89.3 80.6
1969 86.7 91.6 89.3 93.0 88.7
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1971 111.5 108.6 115.0 105.7 112.3
1972 127.7 123.8 137.5 117.5 125.6
SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, pp. 4 and 262—265 in
1973; pp. 328—329 in 1970.
a. From 1953 to 1959 these. figures are the wholesale price indexes of grains and
the wholesale price indexes excluding grains converted from a 1965 to a 1970 base..
cent of GNP or, on the average, almost seven times export earnings. Food
grains and manufactured goods were the most important imports.
MiLITARY GOVERNMENT, 1961 TO 1963
A military coup in May 1961 overthrew the Chang Myon government that
had come to power following the student revolution of April 1960. The mili-
tary government controlled the economy from May 1961 to the end of 1963.
Stagnation developed in the South Korean economy from the spring of 1960
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TABLE 2-6
Balance of Payments, 1953 to 1972
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Gold &
Corn- Corn- Net Official Net Foreign
moditya modity Services Goods & Grant Capital Exchange
Year Exports Imports Net Services Aid Inflows Holdingsb
1953 40 347 28 —279 193 112 109
1954 24 241 37 —180 139 28 108
1955 18 327 43 —266 240 —3 96
1956 25 380 24 —331 298 14 99
1957 19 390 —17 —388 355 18 116
1958 17 344 16 —311 319 —7 146
1959 20 273 25 —228 229 —17 147
1960 33 305 10 —262 256 —1 157
1961 41 283 44 —198 207 19 207
1962 55 390 43 —292 200 19 169
1963 87 497 7 —403 208 108 131
1964 119 365 25 —221 141 27 136
1965 175 420 46 —199 135 —17 146
1966 250 680 107 —323 122 196 245
1967 335 909 157 —417 135 293 356
1968 486 1,322 170 —666 121 476 391
1969 658 1,650 198 —794 98 717 553
1970 882 1,804 119 —803 82 626 610
1971 1,132 2,178 28 —1,018 64 834 568
1972 1,676 2,250 33 —541 52 330 740
SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, pp. 266—267 and p. 271 in
1971; pp. 222—223 and p. 219 in 1973.
a. Customs clearance data f.o.b. includes exports to Viet Nam through U.S.
procurement.
b. End of year figures.
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to the early part of 1962, mainly because of the political and social instability
that followed two upheavals in a little over a year's time. The military govern-
ment, anxious to revitalize the economy, adopted a very expansionary set of
fiscal and monetary policies. These policies brought back inflation in 1962
which accelerated in 1963 (Table 2—5). From 1960 to 1963 the average rate
of inflation was about 15 percent per annum. These same policies, however,
stimulated growth. Although 1962 was a bad year for agriculture, mining and
manufacturing output increased by 14.1 percent. In the next year, which was
good for both agriculture and industry, GNP increased by 8.8 percent.
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MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1961 TO 1963
TABLE 2-7
GNP, Exports, and Imports, 1953 to 1972
(billions of 1970 constant won)
15
Year GNP Exportsa
Exportsa
as Percent
of GNP Importsa Imports
1953 844 17.0 2.0 109.4 12.9 —92.4
1954 890 10.3 1.1 78.1 8.8 —67.8
1955 938 12.9 1.4 104.8 11.2 —91.9
1956 942 11.5 1.2 122.4 13.0 —110.9
1957 1,014 15.6 1.5 144.8 14.3 —129.2
1958 1,067 19.7 1.9 125.3 11.7 —105.6
1959 1,108 22.9 2.1 102.6 9.3 —79.7
1960 1,130 27.4 2.4 117.5 10.4 —90.1
1961 1,184 38.2 3.2 106.6 9.0 —68.4
1962 1,221 43.0 3.5 141.2 11.6 —98.2
1963 1,328 46.2 3.5 179.2 13.5 —133,0
1964 1,442 57.1 4.0 133.3 9.2 —76.2
1965 1,530 80.3 5.2 149.6 9.8 —69.3
1966 1,719 122.3 7.1 237.9 13.8 —115.6
1967 1,853 166.0 8.9 320.7 17.3 —154.7
1968 2,087 235.0 11.3 468.0 22.4 —233.0
1969 2,400 310.1 12.9 583.8 24.3 —273.7
1970 2,589 381.2 14.7 642.4 24.8 —261.2
1971 2,827 459.4 16.3 773.6 27.4 —314.2
1972 3,024 643.3 21.3 801.2 26.5 —157.9
During 1961 and 1962, the military government enacted many economic
reforms including budget and tax reforms, a reform of the foreign exchange
control system, and in June 1962 a currency reform.7 A new budget and ac-
counting law was enacted, and various tax laws were revised to increase do-
mestic tax revenues and, at the same time, to promote business internal saving.
The military government became increasingly concerned about earning
foreign exchange and raising domestic savings since U.S. grant aid was re-
duced after 1960. South Korea's foreign exchange holdings, which had been
increasing through 1960, gradually declined from 1961 to 1963 owing to the
reduction in U.S. aid and the expansionary policies of the military govern-
ment (Table 2—6). The government increased controls on imports and imple-
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SOURCE: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973, pp. 260—261.
a. Export and import figures are taken from Korea's national income accounts
data in 1970 constant prices. Both exports and imports include services and goods.
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Behavior of Key Economic Aggregates
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mented export incentive schemes such as tax exemptions. Measures were also
taken to encourage the inflow of foreign loans and foreign direct investment.
Since domestic savings averaged only 4.3 percent of GNP from 1961 to 1963
(Table 2—8 and Figure 2—1), foreign capital imports and grant aid financed
the bulk of investment which was 12 percent of GNP during the period.8
Commodity imports declined in 1961, but increased sharply between
1961 and 1963 as the result of the expansionary policies. Export growth was
substantial over the period 1961 to 1963; the average annual rate of growth
from 1960 to 1963 was about 38 percent. The trade deficit, however, was still
very large and grew rapidly from 1961 to 1963. Imports increased from $283
I
SOURCE: Bank of Korea.
a. Domestic savings exclude transfers from abroad, and changes in grain inven-
tories which are more a function of the level of the fall harvest than of desired savings
in the form of inventories, but include statistical discrepancy.
b. Excludes grain inventory changes.
00
00
:00
TABLE 2-8
GNP, Domestic Savings, and Gross Investment, 1953 to 1973
GNP
(1970 constant
Domestic Savingsa Gross
(1970 constant (percent (1970 constant (percent
Year billion won) billion won) of GNP) billion won) of GNP)
1953 843.5 —32.3 —3.8 49.1 5.8
1954 890.2 24.2 2.7 83.2 9.3
1955 938.2 9.1 1.0 . 91.9 9.8
1956 942.2 —3.9 —0.4 98.4 10.4
1957 1,014.4 —16.5 —1.6 103.9 10.2
1958 1,067.2 4.4 0.4 101.1 9.5
1959 1,108.3 26.3 2.4 97.0 8.8
1960 1,129.7 19.4 1.7 100.9 8.9
1961 1,184.5 46.9 4.0 ' 108.5 9.2
1962 1,221.0 58.5 4.8 149.2 12.2
1963 1,328.3 55.9 4.2 181.0 13.6
1964 1,442.0 82.6 5.7 151.2 10.5
1965 1,529.7 139.2 9.1 199.5 13.0
1966 1,719.2 201.8 11.7 302.1 17.6
1967 1,853.0 257.5 13.9 387.1 20.9
1968 2,087.1 326.2 15.6 533.2 25.5
1969 2,400.5 408.9 17.0 655.6 27.3
1970 2,589.3 427.9 16.5 677.2 26.2
197! 2,826.8 405.4 14.3 721.6 25.5
1972 3,023.6 467.4 15.5 637.4 21.1
1973 3,522.7 813.5 23.1 893.6 25.4
20
10
I.
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million to $497 million and the trade deficit from $242 million to $410 million
or 15.6 percent of GNP.
Although commodity exports had been growing rapidly since 1959, they As
started from a very low base and did not become significant until 1963, total- lar
ling more than $87 million or about 3.3 percent of GNP. The same year also a i
saw a phenomenal rise in the importance of manufactured exports to more
than 50 percent of the total; the major items being plywood, woven cotton
fabrics, clothing, and iron and steel. col
The First Five-Year Plan arinounced in 1961 reflected the basic eco-
nomic policies of the military government. The annual growth target was 7.1 mc
percent for 1962 to 1966. It listed priorities in the following order: pei
(1) an increase in energy supply, including electric power and coal; ha
(2) an increase in agricultural production and in farmers' incomes; ab
(3) expansion of key industries and social overhead capital;
(4) national land conservation and development through utilization of idle tai
resources, particularly manpower;
(5) an improvement in the balance of payments through the expansion of pe
exports; ex
(6) promotion of technology. C
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC of
REFORM, 1964 TO 1966
of
A nominally civilian government emerged from the general election in early
1964 after three years of military government. South Korean GNP continued in
to grow rapidly from 1964 to 1966, averaging about 9 percent. The rate of
inflation in wholesale prices increased to almost 35 percent in 1964, the
steepest rise since 1956, but declined to 10 percent in 1965 and to 9 per- C
cent in 1966. Rapid economic growth and a reduced rate of inflation in this 1
period were brought about by reforms in 1964 and 1965 and by a stabilization
program introduced in late 1963. The main feature of the program was a strict
limit on expansion of the money supply, which imposed ceilings on the annual rn
and quarterly increases in the four major sources of "high-powered money," w
namely, central bank finance of government deficits, bank reserves, fertilizer F4
loans, and foreign sector deposits. Since government deficit financing through of
central bank channels had been the major factor underlying the monetary ex- di.
pansion in 1961—1963, the government eliminated all deficits from its general
budget beginning in 1964 and engaged only in periodic short-term borrowing. TI
As Chapter 4 explains,, the government reformed the exchange rate in tu
1964 in order to increase incentives for export and to restrain demand for im- de
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Lion ports. In September 1965, the government announced an interest rate reform
that substantially raised interest rates on both bank time deposits and loans.
:hey As a result, bank time and savings deposits increased very rapidly, thus en-
larging the supply of loanable funds. The interest rate reform, however, created
• also a large interest differential between domestic bank and foreign loans, making
• iore the latter particularly attractive.
tton The government made a serious effort beginning in 1965 to increase tax
collections through administrative improvements and minor changes in rates.
It also worked out a comprehensive tax reform program in 1966 for imple-
7.1 mentation in 1967. Government tax revenues gradually expanded from 7.3
percent of GNP in 1964 to 10.8 percent in 1966. Domestic revenues, which
• had been less than half of total central government revenues until 1958 and
about 65 percent in 1964, financed about 75 percent of total central govern-
ment expenditures in 1966 while counterpart funds originating in U.S. assis-
tance financed the balance.
idle The ratio of domestic savings to GNP also increased rapidly from 4.2
f
percent in 1964 to 11.7 percent in 1966. Both private and government savings
0 expanded, the one because of the interest rate reform of 1965 and the other
because of the tax drive in 1965 and 1966. The proportion of gross domestic
investment financed by domestic saving expanded from 31 percent in 1963
to 66 percent in 1966. The trade balance was also greatly improved, since
• exports increased continuously by more than 40 percent a year while the rate
of increase in imports substantially declined after the devaluation in 1964.
The improvement in the trade balance together with the enlarged inflow
of foreign capital brought about a gradual increase in foreign exchange hold-
irly ings over the period. For this reason, the government gradually loosened
ced import controls.
of
the
ler- CONTINUATION OF RAPID GROWTH,
this 1967 TO 1971
ion
rict Rapid growth of the economy continued from 1967 to 1971 with considerably
ual more price stability than there had been throughout most of the period since
World War II. Basic economic policy was generally guided by the Second
zer Five-Year Plan and the Overall Resources Budget for annual implementation
igh of the plan. For this reason, it is important to present the basic targets and
ex- directions of the second plan, announced in mid-1966.
The plan set an annual growth target of 7 percent from 1967 to 1971.
flg. The basic objective was "to promote the modernization of the industrial struc-
in ture and to build the foundations for a self-supporting economy." The plan
described the major targets as follows:
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(1) The emphasis will be placed on attainment of food self-sufficiency,
reforestation, and development of marine resources;
(2) The basis for accelerated and diversified industrialization will be
broadened by giving emphasis to investment in such industries as o
chemicals, machinery, and iron and steel;
(3) Further improvement in the balance of payments situation will be made
by achieving a $700 million level of exports (including $550 million
commodity exports) in 1971 on the one hand and by promoting
import substitution on the other hand;
(4) Population increases will be restricted as much as possible by pro-
moting family planning, while at the same time maximum efforts will
be made to increase employment;
(5) A further sharp focus will be placed on increasing farm productivity
and income through diversification of farming; and
(6) The level of technology and productivity will be raised by the promo-
tion of scientific and management skills and by improvement of man-
power resources.
The actual performance of the economy from 1967 to 1971 far exceeded
the original targets in almost all major sectors. The government revised them
almost every year through the annual Overall Resources Budget according to
actual performance in earlier years and new forecasts.
South Korean real GNP attained an average annual growth rate of more
than 10 percent from 1967 to 1971, exceeding the planned figure by a wide
margin. Exports of goods and services overshot the original goal by 1968,
since both commodity and service exports expanded rapidly owing to an
intensified government export drive and an increase in service earnings from
construction workers and troops in Viet Nam. The commodity export target
which had been set at $550 million for 1971 was actually exceeded by 1969.
Commodity exports in 1971 reached $1,132 million and exports of commodi- j
ties and services exceeded 16 percent of GNP. By 1971, exports of manu-
factures reached 86.0 percent of total commodity exports. Plywood, woven
cotton fabrics, iron and steel, and clothing continued to be major exports.
Electrical machinery, footwear, and wigs also became important.
Despite the rapid increase in commodity exports, the trade balance was
not significantly improved during this period because of a concomitant increase
in imports. The growth of imports reflected gradual over-valuation of the won
as domestic prices rose, enlarged inflows of foreign loans, trade liberalization,
and increased imports of raw materials for exports. However, South Korea's
foreign exchange holdings continued to accumulate rapidly after 1966, mainly
because of inflows of both short-term and long-term foreign loans including
cash loans beginning in 1965. The rapid accumulation of foreign exchange
I.
a
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holdings generated a large expansion in the money supply. Consequently, a
major problem in the annual stabilization programs during this period was the
be neutralization of the additions in bank reserves brought about by the inflow
as of foreign exchange. The major instruments used to sterilize reserves were
• increases in bank reserve requirements, compulsory deposits into the Bank of
tade Korea Stabilization Account, and sales of Bank of Korea stabilization bonds.
• lion
• ting SLOWDOWN, 1971 TO 1972, NEW REFORMS,
AND RECOVERY, 1973
pro..
will From late 1971 through the first half of 1972, industrial production and con-
struction slowed considerably. Growth of GNP in 1972 fell to 7.0 percent
from 9.2 percent in 1971, despite a recovery toward the end of the year. Gross
domestic investment, which declined from 25.5 percent of GNP in 1971 to
mo- 21.1 percent in 1972, dropped absolutely by about 12 percent. This slowdown
an- was caused to some extent by a slackening in the growth of major
export markets, the United States and Japan. Korean export firms were also
ded hurt by a 10 percent surcharge imposed by the United States on most manu-
factured imports.
to A financial squeeze on a number of South Korean firms was another
cause of the slowdown. Many firms that produced primarily for domestic
tore markets had borrowed heavily abroad to finance the import of capital goods
ilde for expansion of capacity. As the official rate for the won went from 317 to
'68 the dollar in December 1970 to about 400 won by June 1972 and as the
ar Japanese yen and other key currencies appreciated in relation to the dollar
• om • in late 1971 and early 1972, the won value of foreign debts held by domestic
firms increased by much more between the end of 1970 and mid-1972 than
69. any inflation in profits. Also, many domestic firms had borrowed heavily and
'di- on a very short-term basis in the unorganized money markets where rates of
riu- interest approached 50 to 60 percent per annum.
ien The government responded to the problems caused by retarded economic
rts. expansion with an Emergency Presidential Decree for Economic Stabilization
and Growth dated August 3, 1972. The decree promulgated a set of economic
vas reforms, predicated, for the most part, on the assumption that resumption of
ase rapid economic growth required financial relief for ailing industrial firms. The
•
changes included the following:
Dfl, (1) Most outstanding unorganized money-market loans to the business
a 5 sector were converted into medium-term and long-term loans at relatively low
aly interest rates. To enforce this measure, the government required both unofficial
ing moneylenders and debtor firms to report all outstanding loans and debts. All
ige unorganized money-market loans, except small ones of less than 300,000 won,
a
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were frozen for terms ranging from six months to three years, with extended
repayment periods after that. During the freeze, debtor firms were to pay only f
1.35 percent monthly interest, regardless of the interest rate originally con-
tracted, which generally ranged from 3 to 5 percent per month.
(2) Both bank deposit and loan rates were reduced as of 'August 3,
1972, the rate on one-year time deposits from 16.8 to 12 percent per annum
and the ordinary bank loan rate from 19 to 15.5 percent. In addition, the
government granted approximately 200 billion won to the banking system for
the replacement of high-interest, short-term loans to the business sector with
low-interest, long-term bank loans, and for special long-term loans for speci-
fled major industries.
(3) The government authorized special accelerated depreciation rules,
allowing 40 to 80 percent more depreciation for specified major industries. In
addition, a 10 percent investment credit was granted for new investment in
the utilization of domestic resources.
(4) The government announced that the foreign exchange rate would be
stabilized at 400 won to the dollar.
The August 1972 reforms marked the beginning of a radically different
approach to economic policy in South Korea. From 1964 until 1972, whole-
sale price inflation had averaged more than 10 percent a year. In the face of
this inflation, a number of measures were taken to stimulate savings and use
of the banking system and to maintain the international competitiveness of the
economy. Most significant of these measures was the maintenance of very high
bank deposit rates and frequent devaluations. The new policy stressed price
stabilization, low interest rates, and a stable exchange rate. It was recognized,
however, that to switch from a regime of rapid inflation, high interest rates,
and frequent devaluations to a more stable regime could only be accomplished
at the cost of financial disaster for most industrial firms in South Korea, which
were heavily indebted, unless special measures were taken. Thus the govern-
ment sponsored a massive debt roll over, not only of loans in the nationalized
banking sector but of private, unorganized money-market loans as well.
The basic plan was to concentrate much of foreseen price increases in
1972 and pursue a rigid stabilization program in 1973. In 1972 utility and
fuel prices were raised so that these government monopolies would not require
future subsidy. As of August 1972, however, the government announced that
utility prices would be frozen indefinitely. The money supply increased sharply
in the last half of 1972 as credit was expanded to accommodate the internal
debt roll over, but the government announced a price stabilization plan for
1973 which included limited increases in the money supply and a reduction in
the rate of growth of government expenditures. The government pledged its
efforts to hold the rate of inflation of wholesale prices to 3 percent or less.
a ' - - - —- -
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Many of the government pronouncements were aimed at cutting expectations of
d future price increases which, if successful, was expected to help stabilization.
Y Although GNP grew slowly in 1972, exports increased sharply, by 48 per-
cent, from $1,132 million in 1971 to $1,676 million. Imports, however, grew
only 3.5 percent in 1972, compared with a 21 percent increase in the previous
1, year. Since service receipts also expanded rapidly because of increased tour-
ism, the overall balance of payments deficit on current account (net goods
C and services) was reduced from $1,018 million in 1971 to $541 million in
1972. Gold and foreign exchange reserves reached $740 million at the end of
Ii the year, an increase of about $170 million over 1971.
This improvement in the balance of payments was made possible by the
combination of two factors: (1) Enhanced international competitiveness of
Korean industries due to gradual devaluation of the won from 317 to about
'I 400 to the dollar between December 1970 and June 1972, and the relative
appreciation of the Japanese yen and other key currencies based on the
Smithsonian Agreement; and (2) the slowdown in domestic economic activi-
ties which not only reduced the demand for imports but also induced domestic
industries to expand into foreign markets.
1973, the growth of real GNP increased to 16.5 percent. The mining
and manufacturing sectors grew about 30 percent while exports exceeded the
f
previous year's total by nearly 100 percent. The price stabilization plan, how-
e
ever, was endangered by very high prices for imported fuels, grains, and indus-
e
trial raw materials.
h
The continued growth of the economy of South Korea and its export
e potential seem to be assumed among South Korean government officials and
businessmen. They often talk of GNP of $1,000 per capita and exports exceed-
ing $10 billion by the early 1980s. If the performance over the last decade con-
tinues unabated, these optimistic expectations are certain to be fulifiled.
NOTES
1. Only the manufacturing establishments whose capital exceeded one million won
are included in this estimate. The total authorized capital of such companies in Korea at
the end of 1940 amounted to approximately 1,725 million won. See the Bank of Korea,
Annual Economic Review of Korea, 1948, pp. 1—100.
t 2. Ibid.
3. Money supply figures for this period, including bank deposits, are not available.
But according to the end-of-year money supply estimated by the Bank of Korea in 1955,
currency in circulation gradually declined from 74 percent of the money supply in 1945
r to 58 percent in 1949.
1 4. These dollar values of exports and imports were estimated by applying the aver-
s age official exchange rate of 0.68 won to one U.S. dollar in 1949 to the current price won
values of exports and imports in Table 2—3.
'a • . .• -.. . a
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5. Exports for 1950 were inflated because of large exports by consignment from
Pusan to Japan just after the outbreak of war. Thus the decline between 1950 and 1951
is somewhat overstated.
6. Nathan and Associates (1954) estimated South Korea's GNP for 1952 and 1953
at $1,384 million and $1,721 million.
7. The currency denomination was changed from hwan to won at 10:1.
8. Both domestic savings and gross investment discussed in this chapter are exclu-
sive of grain inventory changes.
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